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BANKRUPTCY-FAILURE OF CREDITORS TO RECEIVE NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS
As GROUND FOR SETTING ASIDE DIsCHARGE.-The plaintiff petitioned to have
the defendant's discharge in bankruptcy set aside on the ground that notices
of the proceedings, which had been mailed with defective addresses, had
never been received by the plaintiff and other creditors representing about
one third in value. Section 15 of the National Bankruptcy Act [30 STAT.
550 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 33 (1926)] provides that the court may revoke
a discharge if it was obtained through the fraud of the bankrupt. The
lower court, holding that this provision was not exclusive, set aside the
discharge despite the admitted absence of fraud. Held, on appeal, that the
judgment be affirmed. Rash v. Metzger, 31 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
Although the language of the statute could be interpreted as making
fraud the sole ground for revocation, the courts have placed on it a more
liberal construction. The non-negligent failure of an objecting creditor to
file specifications of his claim has been considered sufficient reason for or-
dering a discharge vacated. In re Louisville Nat. Banking Co., 158 Fed,
403 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908); In re Goldenberg & Halbert, 286 Fed. 292 (E. D.
Pa. 1923) ; In 'e Applegate, 235 Fed. 271 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). Contra: In
re Aasand, 7 F. (2d) 135 (D. N. D. 1925); see 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
(13th ed. 1923) 578. An attempt has been made to explain these decisions
on the basis that a discharge can be re-opened for any equitable reason, al-
though it can be absolutely revoked only for fraud. See In re Applegate,
supra at 272. This distinction appears to have no sound basis. See In ro
Aasand, supra at 136. A discharge will not be revoked where the name of
a single creditor was accidentally omitted from the bankrupt's schedule and
he, therefore, received no notice of the proceedings. In rc Monroe, 114 Fed.
398 (D. Wash. 1902). A fortiori, if the notice was properly mailed but was
never received. In re Walsh, 213 Fed. 643 (N. D. N. Y. 1914). But where
notices have been mailed to none of the creditors as required by § 58a of the
Bankruptcy Act the discharge is said to be "void" and can be so declared
at any time. John B. Ellison & Son v. Weintrob, 272 Fed. 466 (C. C. A.
4th, 1921) (not considered a "revocation"); 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY
(3d ed. 1924) § 3622. Where the bankrupt himself seeks to have the dis-
charge vacated for the purpose of amending his schedules, § 15 has no ap-
plication, and his petition will be granted without any allegation of fraud.
In re McKee, 165 Fed. 269 (E. D. N. Y. 1908). But he is nevertheless sub-
ject to the requirement that the petition must be brought within a year.
In re Spicer, 145 Fed. 431 (W. D. N. Y. 1906). In view of the decision in
the instant case it is doubtful just how much remains of the apparent statu-
tory requirement that the discharge of a bankrupt be revoked only for
fraud. It is interesting to compare in this connection the corresponding
provision as to the revocation of composition agreements. BANKRUPTCY
ACT § 13. This section, which is almost identical in wording with the sec-
tion involved in the instant case, has apparently been construed strictly to
limit the powers of the court to cases involving fraud. Cf. In ro Rudniek,
93 Fed. 787 (D. Mass. 1899) ;.In re Abrams & Rubins, 173 Fed. 430 (S. D.
N. Y. 1909).
BANKS AND BANKING-RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTORS OF INSOLVENT BANK
TO D.P0SITORS.-Plaintiff depositors, having received a dividend of 10% on
deposits in a commercial bank, brought suit against the directors for the
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remaining 90%, alleging that the defendants received deposits or permitted
them to be received at a time when the bank was insolvent; that this in-
solvent condition was well known to the defendants, or by the exercise of
the care and diligence required of them by law as directors, should have
been known to them. A statute imposed responsibility for receipt of de-
posits with knowledge of insolvency. A demurrer to the declaration was
sustained. Held, on appeal, that directors are not responsible at common-
law for losses due to their inattention to the bank's affairs; and that the
complaint was insufficient under the statute since the directors were not
"aware" of the insolvent condition. Judgment affirmed. Daniels v. Berry,
146 S. E. 420 (S. C. 1929).
By the majority rule, where deposits are made in a solvent bank which
becomes insolvent through a director's negligence (as with corporations in
general), the director is not responsible to the depositor. Unzion, Nat. Bankr
v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 49 S. W. 1012 (1899) ; Hart z,. Evanson, 14 N. D. 570,
105 N. W. 942 (1895); U. S. F. & G. Co. ,. Corning State Savings Ban:,
154 Iowa 588, 134 N. W. 857 (1912). But some jurisdictions consider di-
rectors as "trustees" of depositors and, as such, liable for "gross negligence
and inattention to the duties of their trust." Foster v. Bank: of Abingdon,
88 Fed. 604 (W. D. Va. 1898); Elliot v. Farmers' Bank, 61 W. Va. 641, 57
S. E. 242 (1907). In the case of a savings bank a stricter rule is generally
applied, directors being held responsible for "negligence." Willians v. Mc-
Kay, 40 N. J. Eq. 189, 53 Am. Rep. 775 (1886) ; Grecnfield Sarings Bank: v.
Abercrombie, 211 Mass. 252, 97 N. E. 897 (1912). Where deposits are re-
ceived by an insolvent bank, the directors may be responsible if there has
been an "active," though innocent, misrepresentation of solvency. Scale v.
Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S. W. 742 (1888); Solomon v. Batcs, 118 N. C. 311,
24 S. E. 479 (1896) (advertising and publishing bank reports). But cf.
Kroeger v. Garkie, 274 S. W. 478 (Mo. App. 1925) (publication of reports
required by law not considered "active" misrepresentation). Where there
is no knowledge of insolvency and no active misrepresentation, directors are
not held liable. Minton v. Stahlman, 96 Tenn. 98, 34 S. W. 222 (1896);
Kroeger v. Garkie, supra. Contra: Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N. E.
676 (1887). Where there is knowledge of insolvency but no "active" mis-
representation, directors are not responsible at common-law. Duffy v.
Byrne, 7 Mo. App. 417 (1879); Sheldon v. Clews, 13 Abb. N. C. 40 (N. Y.
1883). But statutes generally impose criminal or civil responsibility or
both in this situation. Baker v. Stdte, 54 Wis. 363, 12 N. W. 12 (1882) ;
Cummings v. Witnn, 89 Mo. 51, 14 S. W. 512 (1886). Such statutes are
sometimes interpreted to impose criminal responsibility where ignorance of
insolvency is a result of negligence. Meadou'croft v. People, 163 I1. 56, 45
N. E. 303 (1896); State v. Cadwallader, 154 Ind. 607, 57 N. E. 512 (1900).
Contra: State v. Dunning, 130 Iowa 678, 107 N. W. 927 (1906). But both
by statute and at common-law proof of actual knowledge is required for
civil responsibility. Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo. 232, 55 S. W. 1091, 49 L R. A.
323 (1900); Frederick v. McKee, 157 Mlinn. 366, 196 N. W. 270 (1923).
The instant case is thus in accord with the general rule.
BILLS AN NOTES-PAYMIENT r0 WRONGFUL HOLDER AS ACCEPrA=C On
CONVERSION.-The defendant drawee bank had agreed to pay the drawer's
checks, payable to order, as if payable to bearer, without requiring them
to be indorsed or the holder identified. The defendant paid the proceeds
of a check to a person not authorized to receive payment. In a suit against
the bank by the payee, judgment was given for the defendant. Held, on
appeal, that judgment be reversed, on the ground that payment of the
check, with its subsequent retention and charge to the account of the drawer,
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constituted an acceptance. Dawson v. National Bank of Greenville, 144
S. E. 833 (N. C. 1928).
At common-law the true owner was allowed an action of conversion
against the drawee bank where the latter paid to one holding under a forged
or unauthorized indorsement. Kentucky Title Say. Bank v. Dunavan, 205
Ky. 801, 266 S. W. 667 (1924).; Spaulding v. First Nat'l Bank, 210 App.
Div. 216, 205 N. Y. Supp. 492 (4th Dep't 1924); Chafee, Progress of the
Law-Bills and Notez (1919) 34 HARv. L. REV. 255, 270. Contra: Gordon
Fireworks Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 236 Mich. 271, 210 N. W. 263 (1926).
Many courts allowed a recovery on the theory that payment constituted
an acceptance. Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380 (1890); Vanbibber v. Bank of
La., 14 La. Ann. 486 (1859). Contra: First Nat'l Bank v. Whitman, 98
U. S. 343 (1876). Some courts, as in the instant case, have found a
constructive acceptance under § 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
which provides that thereshall be deemed to be an acceptance whon a
drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance refuses within twenty-
four hours after delivery to return the bill to ,the holder. Chamberlain
Metal Strip Co. v. Bank of Pleasanton, 98 Kan. 611, 160 Pac. 1138 (1916).
It would seem, however, that § 137 is not properly applicable to present-
ment for payment, and some cases have so held. First Nat'l Bank v.
Whitmore, 177 Fed. 397 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910); Gordon Fireworks Co, v.
Capital Nat'l Bank, supra; see BRANNON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
(4th ed. 1926)- 824. The clarification of § 137 by expressly excluding pre-
sentments for payment would appear to be desirable. See Turner, Re-
vision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 25, 51.
But the Committee on Amendments of Uniform Laws has proposed to
amend § 137 to include presentments both for acceptance and for payment,
and to make the drawee's default a conversion at face value.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS-REQUIREMENT OF CERTAINTY.-The testator be-
queathed the residue of his estate to the defendant trust company, the in-
come to be used "for the charitable uses and purposes set forth in a resolu-
tion adopted by the Board of Directors ... providing for a community
charitable trust" known as The Cleveland Foundation. This resolution
stated that the funds should be available "for assisting charitable and edu-
cational institutions ...for promoting education, scientific research, ...
to improve living conditions, ... and for such other charitable purposes
as will best make for the mental, moral and physical improvement of the
inhabitants of the City of Cleveland. . . ." The petitioner, heir of the
testator, sought to have the trust declared void as being too uncertain to be
enforced. Judgment was rendered for the defendant. Held, on appeal,
that the judgment be affirmed. Linney v. Cleveland Trust Co., 165 N. E.
101 (Ohio 1928).
One of the distinguishing characteristics of a charitable trust is the de-
gree of uncertainty and indefiniteness permitted in describing itS purposes
and beneficiaries. See Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 514, 82 N. W. 345,
355 (1900). The general intent to establish a charity must definitely ap-
pear or the trust will fail. Aston v. Wood, L. R. 6 Eq. 419 (1868); see
Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457, 509 (1881). Where such an intent is ap-
parent the English courts have tended to sustain the trust though otherwise
indefinite and uncertain. Moggeridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36 (1802) (be-
quest to A to be disposed of "in such charities as he shall think fit"; court
took administration of the trust upon death of A) ; cf. Minot v. Baker, 147
Mass. 348, 17 N. E. 839 (1888). The early American view required a
greater degree of certainty as to specific purposes and classes of benefici-
aries. Matter of Shattuck, 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455 (1908) (bequest
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to trustee for such "religious, educational, or eleemosynary institutions as
in his judgment shall seem advisable" held invalid); Bristol v. Bristol, 53
Conn. 242, 5 At. 687 (1885) ("to such charitable purposes as she [wife]
may deem proper" held invalid); see 3 Po=oY, EQoUIT (4th ed. 1918) §
1025. But the modern tendency toward increased liberality of construction
in favor of charitable uses has led many courts to hold that indefinitenezs
is cured by the appointment of trustees vested with discretion to select the
particular objects of the charity. In re Planck's Estate, 272 Pac. 972
(Wash. 1928); see ZOLLLAN, AmiECAN LAW OF CHAITiES (1924) § 433; 3
PoERoY, op. cit. supra § 1029. And charitable trusts leaving the entire
disposal of the gift to the discretion of trustees have recently been sus-
tained. King v. Rockwell, 93 N. J. Eq. 46 (1921) ("to such charitable
organizations ... as my said executors may deem worthy"); Matter of
Olmstead's Will, 131 Misc. 238, 226 N. Y. Supp. 637 (Surr. CL 1923) ("to
select, choose, and determine whatever objects, works, charity . . . "). But
cf. Wentura v. Kinnerk, 5 S. W. (2d) 66 (Mo. 1928) ("to such charitable
uses and purposes as he [executor] shall determine" held void). The liberal
attitude exemplified in the instant case would seem to be desirable, par-
ticularly where the trust is a foundation of the type here involved.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-EviDENCr-VALmiTY OF STATU-
TORY PRRXSUM'rNs.-The defendant, president of a bank which had become
insolvent, was indicted under a statute providing that "every insolvency of
a bank shall be deemed fraudulent, and the president and directors shall be
severally punished by imprisonment ... provided, that the defendant in
a case arising under this section, may repel the presumption of fraud by
showing that the affairs of the bank have been fairly and legally admin-
istered." It was also provided that "a bank shall be deemed insolv-nt, firzt,
when it cannot meet its liabilities as they become due in the regular course
of business; second, when the actual cash market value of its assets is in-
sufficient to pay its liabilities to depositors and other creditors; third, v.hcn
its reserve shall fall under the amount herein required and it shall fail to
make good such reserve within thirty days after being required to do so by
the superintendent of banks." The defendant offered no witneszes and was
convicted. The conviction was affirmed by the state Supreme Court. Maz-
ley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S. E. 170 (1928). Held, on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, that the statute was unconstitutional since
the provision as to the presumption of guilt was unreasonable and arbi-
trary. Judgment reversed. M11anley v. Georgia, 49 Sup. Ct. 215 (U. S.
1929).
The power of a legislature to enact that in criminal cases proof of cer-
tain facts shall be prima facie evidence of another fact is generally held to
be limited by the requirement that the facts creating the presumption must
bear a rational relationship to the ultimate fact to be proved. Balc7t r. Ala-
barna, 219 U. S. 219, 31 Sup. Ct. 145 (1911) (statute declaring refusal to
perform contract for labor without returning money advanced to be prima
facie evidence of intent to defraud held invalid) ; McFarland v. Amcrican
Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79, 36 Sup. Ct. 498 (1910) (statutory pre-
sumption that anyone paying less for sugar in home state than in any other
state is party to a monopoly in restraint of trade declared invalid) ; Statc
v. Grimnnett, 33 Idaho 203, 193 Pac. 380 (1920) (statute making failure to
retain hides and earmarks of slaughtered cattle for thirty days prima facie
evidence of grand larceny held invalid); see Note (1928) 23 COL L. P-v.
489. While there seems to be no ease expressly repudiating this doctrine,
the requirement is a loose one and the courts often seem reluctant to de-
clare such laws invalid. Cf. State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 46 N. E. 145, 3G
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L. R. A. 179 (1897) (acceptance of deposits by officer of bank thirty days
before insolvency prima facie evidence of intent to defraud) ; State v. Noss-
aman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 Pac. 347 (1920) (possession of cigarettes prima
facie evidence of intent to sell) ; Note (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1007. In
the instant case the court indicates that, had the statutory definition of
insolvency been less inclusive, it might have been willing to uphold the
statute in question. Manley v. Georgia, supra at 216. The rule has been
criticized as being an undue restriction upon the power of the legislature,
inasmuch as the defendant can overcome the presumption by the production
of contrary evidence, so that "no amount of irrational legislation can change
the result." 2 WIGMIO E, EVDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1356. A9 a practical
matter, however, the courts will employ the rule as a means of protecting
defendants against presumptions which permit a possibility of conviction
upon evidence of a type materially less indicative of guilt than that other-
wise required. Compare with the instant case the decision in Ferry v.
Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88, 48 Sup. Ct. 443 (1928).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoWR OF STATE To LEASE TIDAL LANDS.-A Cali-
fornia statute provides for the granting of permission to drill for oil in
tidal lands with the privilege of leasing a limited area on a royalty basis.
Cal. Stat. and Amend. to the Code 1923, c. 285. The surveyor general re-
fused the plaintiff's application for a permit on the ground that the state
had no authority to alienate tidal lands since they were held in trust for
the people. The plaintiff brought mandamus to compel issuance of the
permit. Held, that a writ of mandamus be issued. Boone v. Kingsbury,
273 Pac. 797 (Cal. 1928).
The common-law theory was that the title to tidal lands was vested in
the king and was of a two-fold nature: (1) the jus privatum or proprie-
tary right and (2) the jus publicum or governmental right. 1 FARNIIAM,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1904) 167. The crown could make private
grants of such lands subject to the inalienable jus publicum or public rights
of navigation and fishing. MooRE, HISTORY OF THE FORESHORk (3d ed.
1888) 556. In this country it is generally said that the states have title to
all lands below high water mark in navigable waters, subject to a public
trust for navigation and fishing: GOULD, WATERS (3d ed. 1900) 72; of.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548 (1894). There are numer-
ous dicta to the effect that a state cannot alienate tidal or submerged lands.
S9e State v. West Tenn. Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 600, 158 S. W. 746, 753
(1913) (trustee character of state ownership said to prevent any alienation
of submerged lands); 1 FARNHAI, op. cit. supra at 172 (concluding, ap-
parently from dicta, that the trust doctrine is carried to the extreme in
Wisconsin). The actual cases, however, usually hold that if a state does
not surrender the control necessary for the protection of the public inter-
ests the grant will be upheld. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387,
13 Sup. Ct. 110 (1892) (small grant upheld; grant of area nearly as large
as Chicago harbor invalid); Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N. W.
820 (1927) (grant of shore to steel company in exchange for other land
upheld). It has been said that the transfer must be for a public use. See
Money v. Wood, 118 So. 357, 359 (Miss. 1928) (building islands in Missis-
sippi sound not a public use); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920)
1008. The facts of the instant case would seem to satisfy this requirement,
inasmuch as the development of the natural resources of the state is deemed
to be a sufficient public use. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.
E. 875 (1904) (lease of land in river for artesian well) ; Nedtweg v. Wal-
lace, 237 Mich. 14, 208 N. W. 51 (1926) (ninety-nine year lease of lots for
summer cottages in relicted lake). Furthermore, in the instant case the
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court found that the interests of the public would not be injured. And should
the wells prove to be an obstruction to navigation, their removal could be
required. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cult. Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 33
Sup. Ct. 679 (1913) (no "taking of property" when federal dredging in
furtherance of navigation injures oyster bed); see People v. California Fish
Co., 166 Cal. 576, 599, 138 Pac. 79, 88 (1913).
CONTRACTs-THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY-CONTRAICORS' Surry BONDS.-
A bond given to secure the performance of a contract for the construction
of a public building was conditioned upon the payment of "all persons who
have contracts directly with the principal for labor or materials." The
plaintiff, an unpaid materialman having a contract directly with the prin-
cipal, brought an action against the surety on the bond. The lower court
sustained the defendant's demurrer. Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be reversed. Jefferson County Board of Education v. Union Indemnity Co.,
119 So. 837 (Ala. 1929). In a similar action on an identical bond given in
connection with the construction of a private building the lower court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that judgment be reversed, on
the ground that the stipulation for the payment of materialmen was in-
tended for the sole benefit of the obligee named in the bond, the owner of
the building. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Rainer, Ala. Sup. Ct. 1929.
A few courts take the view that a materialman not named as obligee
cannot recover on the instant type of bond inasmuch as there is no privity
of contract. Jefferson v. Asch, 53 linn. 446, 55 N. W. 604, 25 L. P. A. 257
(1893). All courts agree that, if the bond stipulates that it is for the sole
benefit of the contractor's employer, a laborer or materialman has no right
of action thereon. Crum v. Jenkins, 145 S. C. 177, 143 S. E. 21 (1928).
Likewise all courts, except those taking the narrow view requiring privity
of contract, hold that where it is expressly stated that the bond is executed
for the benefit of laborers and materialmen, they may recover on it. Union
Sheet-Metal Works v. Dodge, 129 Cal. 390, 62 Pac. 41 (1900). Where, as
in the instant cases, the bond, although containing a provision to pay for
labor and material, is silent as to whether persons other than the named
obligee are intended to be benefited, the decisions are in conflict as to whether
an unpaid laborer or materialman can recover against the surety. In such
cases the courts generally treat the right of the laborer or materialman to
recover on the bond as a question of the intention of the parties who exe-
cuted it. Guilford Lnmber Co. v. Johnson, 177 N. C. 44, 97 S. E. 732
(1919); Maryland Casualty Co. -v. Johnson, 15 F. (2d) 253 (W. D. Mich.
1926). But see Corbin, Third Parties as Betzeficiaries of Contractors'
Surety Bonds (1928) 38 YA= L. J. 1, 3. Probably the greater number of
courts do not find an intention to benefit the laborer and materialman, in
spite of the provision for their payment, and refuse recovery regardless of
whether the contract is for a public or private building. Fosmire v. Na-
tional Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920) (public); Dayton
Lumber Co. v. New Capital Hotel, 222 Ky. 29, 299 S. W. 1063 (1927) (pri-
vate); Sun Indemnity Co. v. American University, 20 F. (2d) 556 (Ct. of
App. D. C. 1928) (private); see also cases cited in Corbin, op. cit. upra
at 12, n. 19. There are many cases, however, which allow such a recovery.
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Granite Co., 100 Ohio St. 373, 120 N. E. 405, 12 A.
L. R. 378 (1919) (public); Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Knox TuMe
Co., 150 Md. 40, 132 Atl. 261 (1926) (private) ; see also cases cited in Cor-
bin, op. cit. supra at 9, n. 12. The distinction which the instant court makes
between a bond given to secure the construction of a public building against
which a mechanics' lien could not be filed, and one given to secure the con-
struction of a private building is not without support. 1 WILLISTON, Co'-
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TRACTS (1920) § 372. The desirability of this distinction as a means of
limiting the responsibility of the surety is questionable.
COURTS-JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS--SERVICE ON AGENT
WITHIN STAT.-The plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana, purchased a ticket
over the lines of the defendant railway from an agent in Louisiana. He
was injured while a passenger on the defendant's lines in Virginia. Suit
was brought against the defendant, a foreign corporation, in a federal
court in Louisiana. Service was made upon an agent designated by the
defendant for the receipt of service in compliance with a Louisiana statute.
The defendant contested the jurisdiction of the court. The lower court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, inter alia, that the court had
jurisdiction, since the cause of action arose out of business transacted with-
in the state-namely, the purchase of the ticket from the Louisiana agent.
Judgment reversed on other grounds. Southern Ry. v. Chatters, 49 Sup. Ct.
329 (U. S. 1929).
Where a foreign corporation is doing business within a state, some stat-
utes require the designation of an agent to receive service of process and,
in case of failure to appoint such an agent, provide for service on a public
official, while others permit service on any agent of the corporation within
the state. Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1917) 30 HARV
L. REV. 676, 690. In the former situation, where service is had upon a
public official, the court is nevertheless without jurisdiction if the cause
of action did not arise out of a transaction occurring within the state. Old
Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236 (1907);
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255 (1915). Where serv-
ice is had upon an agent, however, as in the instant case, the court has
jurisdiction over a "personal" claim, regardless of where it arose. Penn.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344 (1917).
Apparently the residence of the plaintiff is generally considered to be im-
material. Cf. Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading C. & I. Co., 222 Fed. 148
(S. D. N. Y. 1915) (resident); Penn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining
Co., supra (non-resident). A few states have limited this rule to resident
plaintiffs, requiring in the case of non-residents that the cause of action
arise out of a transaction within the state. See Lipe v. Carolina C. & 0.
Ry., 123 S. C. 515, 523, 116 S. E. 101, 103 (1923). The Louisiana court has
interpreted the statute here involved to require that the cause of action
arise out of a transaction within the state, even in regard to a suit by a
resident. See State v. North Am. Land and Timber Co., 106 La. 621, 630,
31 So. 172, 176 (1902) ; Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257
U. S. 533, 534, 42 Sup. Ct. 210, 211 (1922). This would seem to be a harsh
requirement. It was avoided in the instant case by the finding that the sale
of the ticket by the agent was a transaction within the state out of which
the cause of action arose.
EMINENT DOMAIN-STATE CONDEMNATION FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES.-A
North Carolina statute authorized the state treasurer to issue bonds to pay
for lands condemned by the state park commission. The lands were to be
transferred by the state" to the federal government to become part
of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, established by act of
Congress. The plaintiff, on behalf of the citizens of North Carolina,
sued to enjoin the enforcement of the statute as being unconstitutional.
The defendant's demurrer was sustained. Held, on appeal, inter alia, that
the fact that the statute authorized the transfer of the title of the con-
demned lands to the federal government did not invalidate the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. Judgment affirmed. Yarborough v. N. C.
Park Comm., 145 S. E. 563 (N. C. 1928).
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The federal government can exercise the power of eminent domain over
land within a state's jurisdiction so long as its use is a necessary adjunct
to the execution of some enumerated constitutional power. Kohl v. Vnitcd
States, 91 U. S. 367 (1S75). This power is not qualified by Art. I, § S of
the Constitution, providing that Congress shall exercise exclusive legislation
"over all places purchased by consent of the legislature of the state in
which the same shall be. . . ." United States v. City of Hobohca, 29 F.
(2d) 932 (D. N. J. 1928). It is clear that state or municipal condemnation
of land for the establishment of local parks, though primarily for an aesthe-
tic purpose, is justified as being for a public use. Wright v. Walcott, 233
Mass. 482, 131 N. E. 291 (1921) ; ef. ShocksnaTr v,. United States, 147 U. S.
282, 13 Sup. Ct. 361 (1893) (condemnation by Congress of land in the Dis-
trict of Columbia for federal park). But it would seem difficult to find with-
in the enumerated powers any justification for federal condemnation for park
purposes of land within the jurisdiction of a state. Cf. United Statcs v.
Gettysburg Ry., 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427 (1S96). The indirect method
upheld in the instant case would seem to avoid this difficulty, as well as any
clash between federal and state sovereignty. But it is sometimes asserted
that a state can exercise the power of eminent domain only for the use of its
own citizens, and, therefore, that it cannot take property within its juris-
diction in behalf of the federal government. 1 NICHOLS, EINENT D0au:;
(1917) § 34. This, however, was at one time the usual procedure. Cf. Burt
v. Merchants' Isurance Co., 106 Mass. 356 (1871) ; Lancey V. Iing County,
15 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645 (1896). As to the theoretical objection that the
state is not acting for the public use of its own citizens, it may well be
argued that the residents of the state will derive sufficient benefit from the
federal park, both because of its proximity and the tourist trade attracted
to the state. Cf. Rockaway Pac. Corp. v. Stotesbury, 255 Fed. 345 (N. D. N.
Y. 1917) (people of state held to derive benefit from property condcmned
for United States for purposes of national defense).
FuTuRE INTERESTS-RULE AGAINST PERprurris--I. Trnpf ,,LTIo oF
OHio STtTUTE.-A will provided for the creation of a life estate in certain
of the testator's issue, with remainder over to those heirs who "would in
law be entitled to the same" if the testator had died intestate at the time
of the death of the last life tenant, at which time the remainders were to
vest. An Ohio statute forbids grants of real property to any but persons
in being or the "immediate issue or descendants" of persons in being at the
testator's death. OHM GEN. CODE (Page, 1926), § 8622. The lower court
granted shares in the final division of the estate to certain of on life ten-
ant's grandchildren, whose parents, born after the death of the testator
and alive at the death of that life tenant, had died before the vesting of the
estate. Held, on appeal, that the decree be affirmed. Von Orcrbcch. v.
DahIgren, 28 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).
The statute involved in the instant case has entirely superseded the com-
mon-law rule against perpetuities in Ohio, in the restriction of grants of
real property. McArthur 'v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 5 Sup. Ct. 652 (1834);
Phillips v. Herron, 55 Ohio St. 478, 45 N. E. 720 (1896); see Dayton v.
Phillips, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 680, 684 (1892). In construing this statute, the
Ohio courts have held that a man's nearest living lineal descendant at his
death, whether that descendant be a child or a grandchild, is an immediate
descendant. Stevenson v. Evans, 10 Ohio St. 307 (1859); Turley v. Turcy,
11 Ohio St 173 (1860). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has
expressly declared, obitcr, that the term "immediate" in the statute is
limited to this interpretation, so that a devise of an estate to a grandchild
of a "person in being at the testator's death" becomes invalid if, as in the
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instant case, the father of the devisee is living at the time of the grand-
father's death. See McArthur v. Scott, supra at 383. The court in the
instant case avoids the difficulty arising from such an interpretation by
re-interpreting "immediate" to mean the nearest living lineals at the date
when the estate vests. While the facts of the instant decision place it
clearly within the common-law rule against perpetuities, it is apparent
that a literal acceptance of the holding would obliterate all restrictions as
to remoteness on real property grants, inasmuch as the statute limits only
the persons to whom grants may be made, and in no other way restricta
the ultimate date of vesting. Moreover, in contradistinction to the rule
at common-law, which holds a future grant void at its making if there is
any possibility that it may prove illegal at the time of vesting, the courts,
under the Ohio statute, have refused to pass on the validity of such a.
grant until the time when the estate is to vest, and have then based their
decisions on the facts as they exist at that time. Phillips v. Herron, supra;
Dahigren v. Pierce, 270 Fed. 507 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921). The court may
later find it advisable to limit the application of the rule of the instant
case to situations where, as in the present one, the estate is to vest upon
the death of a person in being at the time the devise is made, or else it
may revert to the dictum of the Supreme Court in the McArthur case,
supra. In view of the uncertain meaning of the statute and the conflict
of decisions on its interpretation, it might be desirable for Ohio to follow
the example of Connecticut, which in 1895 found a similar statute so
impracticable that it was forced to abolish it in favor of the common-law
rule. See Note (1929) 3 CIN. L. REv. 79.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-TREATIES--EFFECT OF WAR,-Two naturalized
Canadians, who were accustomed to cross the border daily without passports
to work for hire, were arrested pursuant to a Department of Labor ruling
that aliens entering to work for hire were not among the temporary business
visitors exempted from the restrictions placed on immigrants. GENERAL
ORDER 86, April 1, 1927 [construing § 3 of the Immigration Act, 43 STAT.
154 (1924), 8 U. S. C. § 203 (1926)]. The Canadian government protested
this ruling, referring to Art. III of the Jay Treaty of 1794, which accorded
his Majesty's subjects the privilege freely to pass and repass over the
border. New York Times, June 9, 1927, at 27. A habeas corpus proceeding
in their behalf was dismissed by the District Court. The Circuit Court
reversed this judgment, relying upon Art. III of the Jay Treaty. Cooks
v. Karnuth, 24 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 49 Sup. Ct. 12
(U. S. 1928). But, reconsidering the case at the instance of the government
[New York Times, Nov. 20, 1928 at 12] the Supreme Court held, on
certiorari, that the judgment be reversed, on the ground that Art. III of
the treaty had been abrogated by the War of 1812. Karnuth v. United
States, 49 Sup. Ct. 274 (U. S. 1929).
An indication from the executive or legislative branches of the govern-
ment that a treaty provision is no longer applicable will be followed by
the domestic courts. Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); Dickinson,
International Political Questions in the National Courts (1925) 19 AMI. J.
INT. LA W 157. Hence, the instant decision might well have been rested on
the fact that in 1927 the government found the privileges granted by this
treaty provision to be inconsistent with its immigration policy. See Note
of Secretary Kellogg to Minister Massey, New York Times, May 30, 1927,
at 7. In cases -where there has been a war between the parties and the
government has given no indication as to its policy in regard to the treaty
the courts must consider whether a given stipulation seems in its nature
intended to outlast wars. See Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v.
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New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 494 (U. S. 1823). Each stipulation must be
taken separately, treaties being regarded in this connection as divisible.
Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185 (1920). Art. I of the
Jay Treaty belongs to that class of stipulations which accords to the
nationals of each signatory certain rights and privileges of commerce,
navigation, social intercourse, or economic or political status in the terri-
tory of the other. There is some support for the view that such stipulations
are automatically abrogated by war. 2 HYDE, INTE ATIONiL IAW, (1922)
§ 550. But there is strong authority to the effect that such provisions
are merely suspended until the advent of peace. FiorE, IN-rEnN,!TIoNAL
LAW CODFIED (Borhard's Trans. 1918) § 1438; 4 CALvo, LE Dn0iT I.T=-
NATIONAL (5th ed. 1896) § 1931; Comment (1929) 38 YAIx L. J. 514. The
New York Court has gone further, holding that such stipulations are
suspended only to the extent and for the time required by the necezsities
of war. Techt v. H2gh es, supra (holding a stipulation of a treaty with
Austria, according her nationals the privilege of transmitting land in the
United States by descent, still applicable during the war); Note (1921)
34 HARV. L. REv. 776. The Court in the instant case bases its decision on
no governmental pronouncement as to the validity of the treaty, but
appears to adopt the view that this type of stipulation is completely
abrogated by war despite the attendant jeopardization of private intercsts
dependent thereon.
MAsTER AND SERv.ANT-RESPONSIBILITY OF BA STER TO GUMST or SE,A:NT
IN IASTE'S CA .- In a question certified by the lower court it was ashed
whether a master was responsible where his servant, acting within the
scope of his employment in driving his master's automobile, exceeded his
authority by permitting another to ride with him and subsequently injured
the rider through "wanton and wilful" conduct in the operation of the
vehicle. Held (one judge dissenting), that the question be answered in
the negative. Greeson v., Bailey, 146 S. E. 490 (Ga. 1929).
It is uniformly assumed that a servant acts outside the -cope of his
employment when he, without actual authority, invites another to ride in
his master's motor vehicle. Karas v. Bzrns Bros., 94 N. J. L. 59, 110 At].
567 (1920). Hence some courts reject all actions against the master for
injuries to the rider on the theory that the "cause" of the injury, the
giving of the ride, was an act outside the scope of the servant. employ-
ment. O'Leary v. Fash, 245 Mlass. 123, 140 N. E. 232 (1923); Thomas v'.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 9 S. W. (2d) 1 (Ark. 1928). Most courts, however,
have modified this rule on the theory that the rider is a known trespasser
as to the owner and entitled at least to the protection generally given to
trespassers. See Higbee v. Jackson, 101 Ohio St. 75, 80, 128 N. E. 61, 62
(1920). Hence recovery against the owner is allowed where the conduct
of the driver is "wanton and wilful." Higbee v,. Jackson, mepra; Laffcrty
v. Armour Co., 272 Pa. 588, 116 AtI. 515 (1922); Bobos v,. Krey Pacling
Co., 296 S. W. 157 (Mo. 1927). But not where merely "negligent." Hughes
v. Murdoch Storage and Transfer Co., 269 Pa. 222, 112 Ati. 111 (1920);
Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920); Zampella v. Fitz-
henrj, 97 N. J. L. 517, 117 AtL. 711 (1922). A few jurisdictions, however,
have allowed recovery where the driver failed to use "ordinary" care.
Sanborn v. Merriman, 79 N. H. 492, 111 Atl. 751 (1920) ; Kalmich v. White,
95 Conn. 568, 111 AtI. 845 (1920). But cf. Conn. Acts 1927, c. 308; (1928)
38 YALE L. J. 267. The treatment of this problem in terms of duties owed
to trespassers has provided a means of avoiding the operation of the strict
rule which completely relieved the owner from responsibility because the
act of the driver was "outside the scope" of his employment. This has
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had the anomalous effect, however, of placing upon the owner the risks
of the more unusual and less foreseeable conduct of the employee. Since the
ultimate question in these cases is one of determining the proper allocation
of the risks incident to the use of automobiles, and inasmuch as the tests
which have evolved have little relevancy to the underlying social and
economic factors, a reconsideration of the problem from a broader viewpoint
would seem desirable. Cf. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916)
26 YALE L. J. 105; Douglas, Vicarioug Liability and the Administration of
Risk I (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 584.
PARTNERSHIP-TEsTS OF EXISTENCE-CAPACITY TO DISTRIBUTE Risic OF'
Loss.-The defendant advanced $2000 to Small, to be repaid from the
first gross receipts of a theatrical exhibition to be produced. The defendant
also was to receive one-half of the net proceeds of the production; was not
to be responsible for debts incurred; and one Castle, who was to dictate
all policies of the production, was to act as the defendant's "trustee." In
an action by the plaintiff as assignee of claims for labor of employees,
the trial court held the defendant personally responsible. Held, on appeal
(one judge dissenting), that the judgment be affirmed. Nowell v. Oswald,
274 Pac. 423 (Cal. 1929).
Various tests have been evolved to determine the existence of a partner-
ship. Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. BI. 235 (1793) (profit-sharing); Cox v.
Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268 (1860) (agency); see Mollwo, March & Co. v.
Court of Wards, L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435 (1872) (intention); Malt'vern
National Bank v. Halliday, 195 Iowa 734, 739, 192 N. W. 843, 846 (1923)
(entrepreneur test). But each of these has been criticized as being
inadequate. Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1873) (profit-sharing);
(1910) 10 COL. L. REV. 174 (agency); 1 ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIP (1916) §
47 (intention); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II
(1929) 38 YALE L. J. 720-725 (entrepreneur test). The definition adopted
in the Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 6, 7, does not seem necessarily irrec-
oncilable with any of these texts, except possibly the profit-sharing test.
See BURDICK, PARTNERSHIP (3d ed. 1917) 22; Note (1923), 36 HARV. 1.
REV. 1016, 1019; Wright, California Partnership Law and the Uniform
Partnership Act (1921) 9 CALIF. L. REV. 117, 126-131. A reconciliation
of the modern cases has been attempted upon the theory that the courts
have imposed partnership responsibility upon those persons who had the
capacity to distribute the loss or the risk of loss among the consumers of
the business; such capacity requiring both (1) power to formulate and
execute the policies of the business and (2) a participation in the profits
thereof. Douglas, op. cit. supra 720 et seq. A sufficient power under
(1) above consists of such control over certain phases of the business as
to give the possessor effective manipulation of the profit differential. Doug-
las, op. cit. supra 728-733. Cf. Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213, 158
N. E. 77 (1927) (power to veto business policies insufficient); San Joaquin
Light & Power Corp. v. Costaloupes, 274 Pac. 84 (Cal. 1929) (control
over market plus part control over production sufficient). In some instances,
courts have imposed partnership responsibility upon persons although, as
in the instant case, no express allocation of control to them has been
shown. Buford v. Lewis, 87 Ark. 412, 112 S. W. 963 (1908); Wright Co.
v. Green, 196 N. C. 197, 145 S. E. 16 (1928). Although these cases are
seemingly unexplained by the principal theory, it is submitted that a
reasonable implication based upon their facts would seem to reconcile
most of them. Thus, in the instant case, the implication would seem sup-
portable that requisite control over Castle as to the policies of the venture
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was actually possessed by the defendant. But it would seem desirable,
if the courts in fact proceed on some such basis as set forth in the principal
theory, that they determine expressly whether there is sufficient control
in the hands of the alleged partner.
PLEADING-JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFs.-The plaintiff, a lessee, brought an
action against the defendant county to recover for damage to his interest
in the land and to that of his lessor, who had assigned his right of action
to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration. Subsequently, the complaint
was amended to add the lessor's name, "suing for the use and benefit" of
the plaintiff. A motion to strike from the record the amended declaration
was sustained and the pleadings were certified to the Supreme Court of
Appeals. Held, that the ruling be affirmed. The action of the lezsor may
not be joined with that of the lessee because they have separate interests
and have sustained separate damages; and an assignment do2s not cure
This objection. Logan Central Coal Co. v. Coanty Court of Logan Comnea,
146 S. E. 371 (W. Va. 1929).
In requiring separate suits wherever the plaintiffs have separate interests
or have sustained separate damages, the court follows the common-law
rule. Cf. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 244. Even in code states, where
the purpose of the codes was to liberalize rules of joinder, come courts
have adopted highly restrictive requirements. Ballcw Lumbcr & Hardware
Co. v. Mo. Pac. By., 288 MIO. 473, 232 S. W. 1015 (1921) (overcharge
claimants seeking to have assets of the defendant railway impressed with
a trust in their favor held improperly joined where the various transactions
were different as to place and time of execution, etc.). Some states are
clearly tending away from such restrictions. See Grover -e. Ma;ott, 192
Ind. 552, 557, 136 N. E. 81, 82 (1922) (plaintiffs .need not have Equality
of interest in the damages sought); cf. N. Y. CIVIL Pm crxCn AcT § 209;
CLARK, op. cit. svpra at 255. The question of joinder is sometimes avoided
under the codes by assignment of several claims to a single plaintiff. See
CLARK, op. cit supra at 303, n. 33. Such a solution was impossible in the
instant ease because the court was bound by a previous holding that a
statute permitting the assignee of "any bond, note, account, or writing
. . " to sue thereon in his own name did not apply to an assignee of a
tort claim. Barkers Creek Coal Co. v. Alpha Pocahontas Coal Co., 90 W.
Va. 700, 123 S. E. 803 (1924); cf. Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throxing
Co., 98 W. Va. 487, 128 S. E. 280 (1925) (action must be brought in
name of assignor-lessor for benefit of assignee-lessee). The extreme con-
servatism of result in the instant ease seemingly can be remedied only by
the adoption of a modern code.
REAL PROPERTY-RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION-VALIDITY OF RETIINTS
LmiTED IN Ti=_-The defendant real estate company conveyed a lot in
a residential development to the co-defendant X. The deed contained a
provision that the grantee should not convey the land without the grantor's
consent within the ensuing four years. Before the ex\piration of this
period X contracted to sell the land to the plaintiff. The real estate
company refused to consent to the conveyance. In a suit for specific
performance a decree was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Held, on
appeal (one justice dissenting), that the decree be affirmed, on the ground
that the provision was void as a restraint on alienation. Northwest Real
Estate Co. v. Serio, 144 Atl. 245 (DId. 1929).
It is generally recognized that the basis for the rule prohibiting absolute
restraints on the alienation of a fee is the public disadvantage resulting
from the consequent check upon the normal development of the land. See
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Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 683, 93 So. 631, 632 (1922); MINOR, REAL
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1928) § 553 et seq. Generally, as in the instant case,
this rule is applied to limited restraints as well. Mandelbaum v. MoDonell,
29 Mich. 78 (1874) (until devisee should become twenty-five) ; Title Guaran-
tee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470 (1919) (restric-
tion against conveyance to negroes, Chinese, or Japanese). A few
jurisdictions, however, hold limited restraints on alienation to be valid
when the restraint is deemed to be "reasonable" and not subject to the
usual reasons of policy for declaring restraints void. Thus, a restraint
limited in time is oftezi held valid. Frazier v. Combs, 140 Ky. 77, 130
S. W. 812 (1910) (lifetime of grantor); In re Porter, 13 Ont. L. Rep. 399,
7 Ann. Cas. 318 (1907) (lifetime of. grantee); Cox v. Johnson, 242 Ill.
159, 89 N. E. 697 (1909) (till devisee reached age of sixteen). But of.
McFadden v. McFadden, 302 Ill. 504, 135 N. E. 31 (1922) (twenty years) ;
Miller v. Denny, 99 Ky. 53, 34 S. W. 1079 (1896) (requirement of the
consent of the grantor considered an "unreasonable" restraint and void),
Likewise, restrictions against conveyance to a limited class are sometimes
upheld. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.
R. A. 1916B 1201 (1915) (restriction against selling to negroes); Russell
v. Wallace, 30 F. (2d) 98 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1928) (same); see Bruce,
Racial Zoning by Private Contract (1927) 21 ILL. L. REV. 704. More
liberality is shown by the courts in dealing with certain analogous restric-
tions. Thus, "reasonable" restrictions as to the use of land are commonly
upheld. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217 (1918); Los
Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596, 9 A. L. R.
115 (1919); see Note (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 88. And restraints on the
alienation of a limited interest in land may be allowed. Hiles v. Benton,
111 Neb. 557, 196 N. W. 903 (1924) (absolute restraint on the alienation
of a life estate). Contra: Kern. v. Carr, 82 W. Va. 78, 95 S. E. 606, L.
R. A., 1918E 568 (1918). Restrictions on the alienation of a fee when
expressed in the forms of forfeitures upon conditions subsequent or con-
ditional limitations are more often enforced than are mere prohibitions.
Fowlkes v. Wagoner, 46 S. W. 586 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898) ; , urst v. Laoler,
149 Minn. 53, 182 N. W. 720 (1921). Contra: Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S.
296, 11 Sup. Ct. -1005 (1891). In the instant case the court might well
have reached an opposite conclusion upon weighing whatever public disad-
vantages there are in so limited a restraint with the interests of the
adjacent property owners and of the community in a genuine plan of land
development. See dissent in the instant case, at 247.
SALES-RECEIPT OF WORTHLESS CHECK IN CASH SALE-EFFEcT ON RECOV-
ERY AGAINST INNOCENT SUB-VENDEE.-The plaintiff agreed to sell a
diamond ring for cash. He delivered the ring to the buyer and received a
check in payment. The check was subsequently dishonored. The buyer
sold the ring to the defendant, an innocent purchaser for value without
notice. The plaintiff brought trover. Judgment was rendered for the
defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Chafin W.
Cox, 147 S. E. 154 (Ga. 1929).
In most jurisdictions, as in the instant case, the vendor of a chattel in
a cash transaction who has received, as cash payment, a worthless cheek
or sight draft may recover the chattel or its value even from an innocent
purchaser for value from his vendee. National Bank of Commerce v.
Chicago R. R., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N. W. 342, 9 L. R. A. 263 (1890) (check);
Freeman v. Kraemer, 63 Minn. 242, 65 N. W. 455 (1895) (sight draft);
see Voldt, Cash Sales (1928) 14 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 1. The same result
has been reached although the seller indicated by his conduct that he relied
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on the buyer's credit. People's State Bank of Mich. Valley v. Brown, 8O
Kan. 520, 103 Pac. 102 (1909). An unreasonable delay in presenting the
check will defeat the vendor's claim. Oidridge t% Sutton, 157 Mo. App.
485, 137 S. W. 994 (1911). What constitutes an unreasonable dclay is
uncertain. Cf. Oldridge v. Sutton, supra (thirty day delay held unrcazon-
able); People's State Bank v. Brovn, supra (three weeks delay held not
unreasonable as against attaching creditor of buyer). In the absence of a
recording act, however, the bona fide purchaser from a conditional vcndee
has been protected. Corner v. Gunningham, 77 N. Y. 391 (1879). Contra:
Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk & B. St. Ry., 187 Mass. 500, 73 N. E. 646
(1905). So also the innocent purchaser of goods released on a trust
receipt is protected in some jurisdictions. Glass v. Continental Guarantce
Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921). But see Frederick, The Trust Rcccipt
as Security (1922) 22 CoL. L. Rsv. 395, 546. The tendency is to wipe
out secret liens. Cf. In Te Richhcimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913)
(trust receipt unrecorded, innocent purchaser of goods protected); NEW
YORK ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 42, § 65 (bona fide purchaser of
goods sold on unrecorded conditional sale protected). It is submitted that
in business practice the seller who takes a check relies, as his ccnduct
indicates, on the credit of the maker. See WILLISTON, SLES (2d ed. 1924)
§ 346. The seller desiring the security accorded him in the instant case
should be required to insist on payment in money at the time of delivery
or to ship his goods either C. 0. D. or on a seller's order bill of lading.
SPECIFIC PERFORAIANCE-RIGHT OF VENDOR TO SPECIFIC PEP~o0RnIA.nCE
AGAINST PURCHASER's ASSIGNEE.-The defendant was the assignee of a
contract for the purchase of land. He obtained from the plaintiff, the
vendor, an extension of the performance date to permit the completion of
a title search. Thereafter he refused to perform. The lower court granted
the plaintiff's prayer for specific performance on the ground that the
defendant's demand for an adjournment was an assertion of a right under
the contract and obligated him to perform its duties. Held, on appeal, that
the decree be reversed. Lan gel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 16 - N. E. 890 (1928).
The assignee of a contract for the purchase of land may require the
vendor to convey. Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922).
He is not, however, bound by the duties of the contract in the absence of
an agreement to that effect. Adron z?. Evans, 217 N. W. 397 (S. D. 1927) ;
5 PoiAmoy, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) § 2274. If the assignee
has sought specific performance he may thereafter be required to discharge
the obligations of the contract. H. & H. Corp. v. Broad Holding Corp., 204
App. Div. 569, 198 N. Y. Supp. 763 (2d Dep't 1923). But the fact that
he has partially performed the assignor's duties is not ground for requiring
him to complete their performance. Meycr v. Drocgemuellcr, 163 'Minn.
245, 206 N. W. 391 (1925). But cf. Senninger v. Rowley, 133 Iowa 617,
116 N. W. 695 (1908). Nor is he liable, as assignee, even though the
terms of the contract purport to bind assignees. Southcrn, Pac. Co. v.
Butterfield, 39 Nev. 177, 154 Pac. 932 (1916). The proposal of the
American Law Institute, expressly rejected by the instant case, is that
the assignee's acceptance of the assignment should be deemed a promise
to discharge the assignor's duties unless a contrary intention is shown.
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENTS (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 164. The vendor could
then enforce this promise as a third party beneficiary. Grismore, I. the
Assignee of a. Contract Liable for the Non-Pcrformancc of Delegated
Duties? (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 284; cf. Steward v. Sirrinc, 267 Pac. 598
(Ariz. 1928). Whether such a rule would more nearly give effect to the
intentions of the parties seems to be a matter for conjecture. It does
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zeem, however, that courts should find an implied promise by the assignee
to discharge his assignor's obligations where his actions indicate 'such an
intention. Cf. Senninger v. Rowley, supra; Imperial Refining Co. v. Kano-
tex Refining Co., 29 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) (assignment of con-
tract to buy oil stipulated that assignee connect pipe lines and pay at certain
rates; assignee held bound to take oil as required by contract); Duntz V.
Ames Cemetery Ass'n, 192 Iowa 1341, 186 N. W. 443 (1922) (assignee's
acceptance and retention of substantial benefits under the contract rendered
ihim liable). But of. (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 773; N. Y. L. J. Nov. 8, 1928,
at 636. It is submitted that in the instant case the defendant's demand for
an extension of the time .for performance to permit the completion of his
title search indicated an intention to perform the contract dutiev if the
title was satisfactory, particularly if the demand was made as a matter
,of right, as indicated by the lower courts.
TAXATION-ESTATE: TAX-TENANCY BY THh ENTIRETY.-The testator and
-his wife owned real and personal property as tenants by the entirety. The
-federal estate tax taxes a transfer of the net estate of every decedent
expressly including therein any interest held by the decedent and spouse
as tenants by the entirety. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. §§ 1092, 1094
(1926). The testator died and the plaintiff, his executor, paid the tax
'on the jointly owned property under protest. Suit was brought in a
-ederal court in Pennsylvania to recover the amount so paid. Held, that
property held by tenants by the entirety is not subject to the estate tax
since, under Pennsylvania law, there is no transfer of interest from one
tenant to the other on the death of either. Judgment for the plaintiff.
Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Phillips, 30 F. (2d) 395 (M. D. Pa. 1929).
The federal estate tax purports to tax only the power to transmit property
at death. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 41 Sup.
Ct. 506, 507 (1921). When husband and wife take property as tenants
by the entirety, it is said that the entire estate vests in both tenants at
the time of the conveyance and that no new interest is transferred to the
survivor at the death of the other; the interest of the deceased spouse
simply ceases to exist. See Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 522, 84 At. 953,
954 (1912); Matter of Lyon, 233 N. Y. 208, 211, 135 N. E. 247 (1922).
It may be argued that the surviving spouse does acquire benefits at the
death of the co-tenant, in that all the rents and profits go to the survivor
and the survivor may dispose of the property. The theory, however, is
that these benefits are derived from the original conveyance and are not
the result of a transfer from the decedent. See Tyler v. United States,
28 F. (2d) 887, 893 (D. Md. 1928); cf. Carter v. English, 15 F. (2d) 6,
7 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) (joint tenancies); (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 885. For
this reason, in states where the common-law doctrine of tenancies by the
entirety is still adhered to, the surviving tenant is not chargeable under the
local inheritance or succession taxes. PINKERTON AND MILLSAPS, INIIEI-
TANCE AND ESTATE TAXES (1926) §§ 192, 199. Before its amendment in
1924, it was doubtful if the federal estate tax included tenancies by the
entirety. See Blount v. United States, 59 Ct. C1. 328, 347 (1924), appeal
dismissed, 273 U. S. 769, 47 Sup. Ct. 20 (1926). Since its amendment,
however, it has been construed as expressly including tenancies by the
entirety and therefore as being unconstitutional in this regard either as a
direct tax without apportionment or as a denial of due process, the tax on
the decedent's estate being measured by the property of another. Tyler v.
United States, supra. Likewise the Revenue Act of 1918 has been declared
invalid insofar as it attempted to tax the dower, curtesy, or statutory
interest of the surviving spouse. Hibbard v. Crooks, 25 F. (2d) 896 (W.
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D. Mo. 1927); Munroe v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 230 (D. Neb. 1925),
appeal dismissed, 273 U. S. 775, 47 Sup. Ct. 337 (1927).
TORTS-FAmILY CAR DOCTRINE--PRESUZIPTION THAT SON IS DRIVlNG WITH
PERIISSION OF FATHEp-The defendant's son, while driving his father's
car, negligently injured the plaintiff. Under § 2S2-e of the New York
Highway Law the owner of a car is responsible for damage caused by its
negligent operation when driven with his permission. Upon the issue of
permission the plaintiff offered only one witness who testified that she had
seen the son driving this car six to twelve times, but that he had told her
that he had taken it without permission. The defendant and his son both
testified that there was no consent on this particular occasion. The jury
found a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the verdict was
against the weight of evidence. Judgment reversed. At,.atcr v. Lob,
233 N. Y. Supp. 309 (N. Y. Co. Ct. 1929).
One effect of § 282-e of the New York Highway Act is to extend the
"family car" doctrine into New York. See Grant v. Kncppcr, 245 N. Y.
158, 164, 156 N. E. 650, 652 (1927). The enforcement of this doctrine is
aided in most states by a "presumption," an "inference," or both, or a
"conclusive presumption" that a child driving his father's ear haq his
consent. Landry v. Oversn, 1S7 Iowa 2S4, 174 N. W. 2,15 (1919) ("pre-
sumption coupled with an inference"); Ha.,ins ,. Ernmatingcr, 211 Mich.
578, 179 N. W. 249 (1920) (conclusive presumption); Dicrk7s v. Nczeaow,
49 Cal. App. 789, 194 Pac. 513 (1921) (inference); Way v. Guest, 272
S. W. 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (presumption). There are similar pre-
sumptions that a servant, employed for such services, is acting within the
scope of his employment when driving the owner's car. Ward v. Tcl!ri , GO
Colo. 47, 153 Pac. 219 (1915). Some courts will presume that nnyne
driving the owner's car is acting as his agent. Balcr v. Mazceh, 20 Ariz.
201, 179 Pac. 53 (1919) ; Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. Rev. 513. In the ab : nc'
of evidence for the defendant on this point, however, the question of con-ent
or agency will usually be left to the jury. Baldizin -e. Par,-o.n, 193 Iowa
75, 186 N. W. 665 (1922). But see Foundation Co. v. Hcndcrason, 2G4 Fed.
483, 487 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920). It is said that such rules are justified, vince
they force the production of evidence by the party better able to do so.
5 WiGmor, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2510a. But see instant case, Gzpra
at 315. No accurate generalizations can be made as to how much evidcnce
is required to defeat such presumptions and set aside a verdict for the
plaintiff or support a directed verdict for the defendant, since, in addition
to the differences between jurisdictions, a high degree of variability iz
introduced by the particular circumstances of the use of the car and the
credibility of the witnesses. Cf. Way v,. Guest, wupra, with Dohurty v.
Haglewood, 90 Ore. 475, 175 Pac. 849 (1918). Many states do require
more than the mere assertion of interested witnesses. Landry r. Orcrwnl;
Dierks v,. Newsom; Ward v. Teller, all svpra. It would seem that if a
mere denial of consent by the parties concerned is allowed to settle the case
the purpose of the family car doctrine is largely defeated.
TORTS-PROXI=ATE CAUSE As OBSCURING THE DUTY Pnonuis.-The
defendant's barge, Chancellor, a trespasser near a certain wharf, was
moved out by the wharf owner to allow the libellant's barge, Henlopen, to
dock. As the tide ebbed, the Chancellor grounded on a ridge and listed
shoreward against an intervening non-trespassing barge, crushing the
Henlopen against the wharf. The lower court allowed a recovery for
damages. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed. TIhe Chancellor,
30 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
Cases of this sort, where in spite of an "intervening human agcney"
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the principal question involved concerns the existence or violation of a duty,
have habitually been treated by the courts in terms of "proximate cause."
Cf. The Panther, 5 F. (2d). 64 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). Thus negligence is
"assumed" in the original act of the defendant, and is followed through to
determine whether one of the forces which join with it in producing the
ultimate harm is sufficiently independent to neatralize the defendant's
'wrong." See Cleary Bros. v. Port Reading R. R., 29 F. (2d) 495, 497
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928). (barges, made fast by defendant's tug, broke adrift, were
tied up to dock by fireboat, then broke adrift again). According to the
most strict view, any intervening act of another done deliberately relieves
the defendant of responsibility. Singleton Abbey v. Paludina [1927] A. C.
16 (reasonable but wrong choice of captain in dangerous position held
"proximate cause" of collision). But many courts allow recovery where the
defendant could reasonably have foreseen the intervening force, regardless
of its deliberateness or the foreseeability of its consequences. The George
H. Jones, 27 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) (reasonable manoeuver of
third ship, contributing toward collision, held not to absolve first wrong-
doer); see (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 720. The danger of this "proximate
cause" approach lies in the probability of hampering judgment by obscuring
the fundamental problems of duty-existence and duty-violation. See Green,
Are There Dependable Rules of Causation? (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV.
601, 626. In the instant case the court sanely avoided the awkwardness of
the "proximate cause" verbiology. It based its decision on the absence of
a duty. But it seems that a barge in the position of the defendant's should
be held to a duty to use reasonable care towards vessels that lay or wore
likely to be placed near the same dock. The precise point at issue seems
rather to have concerned the violation of this duty, i.e., negligence. See
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (1928) 28 CoL. L. REV. 1014,
1029-1031. But the language of the decision is perhaps immaterial here,
inasmuch as this was an admiralty suit in which the judge passed upon
the whole case, so that the negligence question, ordinarily requiring sub-
mission to a jury, was also before the court for solution.
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